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A Scary Tale: Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers
VICTORIA MIKESELL MATHER*
During the 1970's, public attention in the United States and Great
Britain was drawn to the problem of the battered and abused spouse.,
People gradually became aware that the fairy tale story of romance,
of meeting your prince and living happily ever after was exactly the
opposite experience for large numbers of women, including many
members of the upper economic and social classes.
In the late 1970's and early 1980's, the attention of the legal and
psychological community specifically focused on the issue of the
battered woman who killed her abuser, arguably in self defense. 2 At
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. LL.M. 1987,
J.D. 1981, B.S. 1978, University of Illinois. The author would like to thank her research
assistant, Luis Garcia, for his case research, and her colleague, Michael Ariens, for his
comments.
I. The battered women's movement is said to be founded by British author and activist,
Erin Pizzey, who established the first battered woman's shelter in 1971. DEL MARTIN, BATTERED
WwvEs 6 (1976). Several books discussing the plight of battered women were published during
the 1970's and early 1980's. See, e.g., BATTERED WOMEN (Donna M. Moore ed., 1979); BATTERED
WOMEN: A PSYCHOSOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (Maria Roy ed., 1977); R.
EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBAsH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIvEs (1979); DAVID FINKELHOR ET
AL., THE DARK SIDE OF FAmmms (1983); JENNIFER B. FLEHo, STOPPING WIFE ABUSE (1979);
MARTIN, supra; ERIN Pzany, ScREA. QUIETLY OR THE NEIGHBORS WL.L HEAR (1974); MARA
Roy, THE ABusIVE PARTNER: AN ANALYSIS OF DOME sTIC BATTERINO (1982) [hereinafter Roy,
THE ABUsIVE PARTNER]; SUSAN SCIECTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE (1982); DANIEL SONKIN
ET AL., TH MALE BATTERER: A TREATMENT APPROACH (1985); MURRAY STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND
CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FA mY (1980); LENORE E. WALKER, Tan BATTERED
WOMAN (1979) [hereinafter WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN]; LENORE E. WALKER, TH BATTERED
WOMAN SYNDROME (1984) [hereinafter WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME].
2. In addition to the books reviewed here, see, e.g., WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES
(Elizabeth Bochnak ed., 1981); Clement Brown, Expert Testimony on Battered Woman Syn-
drome: Its Admissibility in Spousal Homicide Cases, 19 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 877 (1985); Phyllis
L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8
HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 121 (1985); Loraine P. Eber, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or
to be Killed, 32 HASTINOS L.J. 895 (1981); M. Julianne Leary, A Woman, a Horse, and a
Hickory Tree: The Development of Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome in
Homicide Cases, 53 UMKC L. REv. 386 (1985); Victoria M. Mather, The Skeleton in the
Closet: The Battered Woman Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L.
REv. 545 (1988); Marilyn H. Mitchell, Does Wife Abuse Justify Homicide?, 24 WAYNE L. REv.
1705 (1978); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law
of Self-Defense, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623 (1980); Roberta K. Thyfault, Self-Defense:
Battered Woman Syndrome on Trial, 20 CAL. W. L. REv. 485 (1984); Lenore E. Walker et
al., Beyond the Juror's Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L. REv. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Walker et
al., Beyond the Juror's Ken]; Colleen Cacy, Comment, The Battered Woman's Syndrome
Defense, 34 U. KAN. L. REv. 337 (1985).
Some other works of interest in this area are two books cited by Angela Browne on
"partners killing partners." PETER D. Cluns, MARITAL VIOLENCE: A STUDY OF INTERSPOUSAL
HOMICIDE (1978); JANE To mAN, Tan MURDERESS: A PSYCHOSOCIAL STUDY OF CRIMINAL HOM-
ICIDE (1978). Two other books on women and crime are FREDA ADLER, SISTERS IN CRIME (1975),
and LEE H. BOWKER, WOMEN AND CRI IN AMERICA (1981).
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least twenty appellate court cases decided during 1989-1990 involved
a battered woman who killed her abuser.' During the period 1987-
1989, four books were published on this subject: Terrifying Love, by
Lenore E. Walker;4 Justifiable Homicide, by Cynthia K. Gillespie;
5
When Battered Women Kill, by Angela Browne; 6 and Battered Women
Who Kill, by Charles Patrick Ewing.'
Most of the writing by legal and other scholars in the area tends
to focus on the end result: What do we do with the batterer who
abuses his mate, and what do we do with the battered woman who
has killed her abuser?' Some of the earlier scholarly efforts dealt with
attitudes and institutional policies of police, prosecutors, judges, social
workers, juries, and the general public in dealing with battered women
and abusive men. 9 Substantial changes in many of these policies and
attitudes have resulted.' 0 However, the focus remains on cleaning up
the mess after the situation is out of control, perhaps even after
3. See, e.g., People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), appeal denied,
Cal. LEXIS 906 (Cal. Mar. 1, 1990); People v. Hare, 782 P.2d 831 (Colo. Ct. App.), cert.
granted, 1989 Colo. LEXIS 555 (Colo. Nov. 27, 1989), and aff'd, 800 P.2d 1317 (Colo. 1990);
Chapman v. State, 386 S.E.2d 129 (Ga. 1989); Nunnelley v. State, 373 S.E.2d 755 (Ga. 1988);
Motes v. State, 384 S.E.2d 463 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Pugh v. State, 382 S.E.2d 143 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1989); People v. Jackson, 535 N.E.2d 1086 (Il. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 541 N.E.2d
1111 (Ill. 1989); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988); Commonwealth v. Craig, 783
S.W.2d 387 (Ky. 1990); State v. Moore, 568 So. 2d 612 (La. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Hennum,
441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989); State v. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State
v. Briand, 547 A.2d 235 (N.H. 1988); State v. Myers, 570 A.2d 1260 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1990); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989); State v. Clark, 377 S.E.2d 54 (N.C.
1989); State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990); State v. Furlough, 797 S.W.2d 631 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1990); State v. Hanson, 793 P.2d 1001 (Wash. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 803 P.2d
325 (Wash. 1990); Griffin v. State, 749 P.2d 246 (Wyo. 1988).
4. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LovE (1989) [hereinafter WALKER, TERRIFYING
LoVEl.
5. CyNTmA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE (1989).
6. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL (1987).
7. CHARLES P. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE AS
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (1987).
8. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 1-2 and 4-7, as well as the four books reviewed
herein.
9. See sources cited supra notes 1-2; see also JuLIE BLACKMAN, INTIMATE VIOLENCE: A
STUDY OF INJUSTICE (1989); Michael A. Buda & Teresa L. Butler, The Battered Wife Syndrome:
A Backdoor Assault on Domestic Violence, 23 J. FAm. L. 359 (1984); Sunny Graff, Battered
Women, Dead Husbands: A Comparative Study of Justification and Excuse in American and
West German Law, 10 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoM. L.J. 1 (1988); Christine Littleton, Women's
Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U.
Cm. LEGAL F. 23; Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering:
Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REv. 267 (1985).
10. Media coverage of domestic violence has increased. The Burning Bed, a television
movie based on a true story, see THE BURNING BED (CBS/Fox 1986), was widely discussed.
FArrIT McNULTY, TE BURNING BED (1981). Battered women's shelters, common in 1991, were
unheard of twenty years ago when Erin Pizzey began the fight to recognize the plight of abused
women. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 6. Gloria Steinem points out that even the phrase "battered
women" is new. GLORIA STEINEM, OUTRAGEOUS ACTS AND EVERYDAY REBELLIONS 149, 159
(1983).
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someone is dead, rather than on preventing the abuse in the first
place. This is a far more difficult problem to grapple with, since it
is not capable of resolution by a change in a legal test or standard
of proof, or even by mere enforcement of existing laws.
This focus on the end result tends to be true of the feminist
scholarship in this area. The battered woman's movement is a feminist
cause and has long been identified as such." This makes sense, since
it is basically a woman's issue in that it disproportionately affects
women and, indirectly, children, and that it was not treated as a
serious or important problem until very recently. However, it is
interesting that most of the literature in this area focuses almost
exclusively on the male-female dichotomy in law and society and
virtually ignores the pervasive effect of violence. Violence, I think, is
the other half of the equation. In fact, some studies show that women
may be abusive to men almost as often as men are abusive to women,
although the physical consequences of abuse tend to be less severe
for men than for women.1 2 Also, women tend to physically abuse
their children more than men.' 3
All four books (the Ewing book is somewhat distinctive) take a
feminist, or at least revisionist, approach in their recommendations
for the legal system in dealing with battered women. This article will
review the four books and comment on where the legal system and
society stand today on the issues of violence in general and spousal
violence in particular. In general, it is my view that although the
feminist or revisionist approach is useful, it is only one facet of what
we should be evaluating when we deal with family violence issues.
Lenore Walker is a well known authority on the subject of the
battered woman syndrome. She has written two other books in this
area and has frequently testified as an expert witness for the defense
in cases where a battered woman has killed her abuser. 4 Unlike her
previous works, Terrifying Love goes beyond a compilation of stories
told by battered women interviewed by Walker. 5
11. In addition to the feminist perspectives of Browne, Gillespie, and Walker, many
other writers in this area are active feminists-for example, Christine Littleton, Del Martin,
Susan Schechter, Elizabeth Schneider, and Maria Roy.
12. See ANSON D. SHUPE ET AL., VIOLENT MEN, VIOLENT COUPLES: THE DYNAMCs OF
DOMESTc VIOLENCE 45-68 (1987); MURRAY A. STRAUS & RICHARD J. GELLES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE
IN AMERICAN FAunms: RISK FACTORS AND ADAPTATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN 8,145 FAMILIES 161-
65 (1990) [hereinafter STRAUS & GELLES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE].
13. See STAus & GEu.ES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 12, at 247-49.
14. See WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 1; WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN SYN-
DROME, supra note 1; WALKER, TERRIFYING LovE, supra note 4, at 302-27.
15. See sources cited supra note 14.
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Walker's book is subtitled Why Battered Women Kill and How
Society Responds. 6 The book is divided into three sections. The first
part, called "Cheating Their Destinies," presents some introductory
material and reviews Walker's cycle of violence theory of spousal
abuse. 17 She then discusses the psychological concepts of intermittent
reinforcement, learned helplessness, and post traumatic stress disorder
as they relate to the phenomenon of the battered woman." The first
section also contains a chapter on terror-how it is created in the
mind of the battered woman, and how it affects her thinking. 9
Part two of the book attempts to explain why a battered woman
would kill her abuser. ° Although Walker indicates that, in her ex-
perience, there is not a large difference between a battered woman
who kills and one who does not, certain factors are more frequently
seen in the situation where the woman killed her abuser. These include
the severity of the physical and psychological abuse inflicted on her,
alcohol or drug use by the batterer, sexual violence, and incest or
other danger to children.2 1 She also emphasizes the fact that many
battered women are themselves survivors of incest.Y
In the latter sections of part two, and in the last section of the
book concerning the legal system and its treatment of the battered
woman who has killed, Walker states the central thesis of Terrifying
Love. She defends the action of a battered woman who has killed
her abuser as quite possibly a normal, reasonable and psychologically
healthy response to her situation. 23 In contrast to her previous works,
16. WALKER, TERRITYUG LovE, supra note 4.
17. See id. at 42-47. According to the cycle of violence theory, the parties involved in
an abusive relationship continuously go through a three-phase pattern in their interaction with
each other. Id. at 42. The first phase is called the tension-building phase, and it is characterized
by initially minor forms of battering (verbal and physical), which gradually escalate over time
until the parties reach phase two-the acute battering incident. Id. at 42-43. This is a serious
severe beating, which is characterized by the batterers' lack of control during the beating. Id.
at 43-44. Finally, during the reward phase, the batterer is contrite, loving, generous, and kind
to his partner. Id. at 44-45.
18. Id. at 47-53. Walker finds the concept of learned helplessness particularly applicable
to the situation of the battered woman. Id. at 50-51. The concept was developed by Martin
Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania. Id. at 49. He placed dogs in cages
and administered electrical shocks at random. Id. The dogs eventually became passive and
would not leave their cages to escape the shocks even when the doors were left open. Id. at
49-50. The dogs had learned helplessness and had to be re-trained to escape the shocks. Id. at
50.
19. Id. at 64-97.
20. Id. at 101-68.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 152. Walker believes that there may be a connection between early incestuous
relationships and the ability of a batterer to attract a woman who was the victim of such a
relationship. Id. at 152-53.
23. Id. at 169-200.
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this book reveals a distinctly personal and feminist perspective.
From the feminist viewpoint, Walker argues that the mental
health profession has done a great disservice to many of these battered
women over the years in diagnosing them as "crazy" or insane when
they strike back at their attackers3u She also points out that some of
the stereotypes of women that our society maintains are harmful and
unfair to the battered woman. 25 Women are expected to be emotionally
unstable, and may act in an irrational manner.26 However, society
does not expect, and may in fact fear, the woman who dares to use
violence or anger in response to the life-threatening behavior of a
man.27 Walker also raises the issue of racism and economic discrim-
ination in this context, pointing out that a black or a poor woman is
far more likely to be convicted of a crime if she strikes back and kills
her abuser.
28
Walker includes a critique of the legal system, both generally and
as it affects the battered woman. 29 The bureaucracy is reluctant to
actually harm the batterer, even though he may be harming his mate. 0
The family law courts can be slow, protective orders difficult to
obtain, and legal representation expensive. 3 The law is protective of
parental rights, and unsupervised visitation of children may be allowed
even if abuse is suspected.3 2 The law of both homicide and self defense
tends to follow traditional male notions of strength, of what is a
reasonable fear, and when one has a duty to retreat. In this section,
Walker borrows from other feminist theories and argues that women
think differently than men: Women see events in context and relate
24. Id. at 176-78.
25. Id. at 188-89.
26. Id. at 186. In this regard, Walker specifically stated:
The common cultural image of a woman gone crazy from the pain of a broken
heart is so much a part of our folklore that it's natural for people, including people
on a jury, to believe that any woman who kills a man she loves does so because of
jealousy or out of a sense of betrayal.
This stereotype feeds into the cultural myth of women being biologically pre-
destined to greater emotional instability than men, in more ways than one the
"weaker" sex.
Id. at 188.
27. Id. Walker stated: "I believe that there is a tacit understanding, in Western culture,
that violence lies in the province of male prerogative. A woman adopting 'male' survival
techniques is likely to be punished." Id. See id. at 218-20.
28. Id. at 207-08.
29. See id. 235-63.
30. Id. at 241.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 242-43.
33. See id. 258-63. See also sources cited supra note 2.
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them in a narrative form, whereas men see events in discrete incre-
ments and relate them as factual building blocks. 34
Terrifying Love contains several personal anecdotes. For example,
when discussing the terror that a battered woman might feel, Walker
tells the story of a friend, a female attorney, who was shot by the
abusive husband of a battered client. 5 This struck a chord for Walker,
making her share some of the fear and helplessness that a battered
woman must feel, knowing that her abusive mate is always a potential
threat, a time bomb waiting to explode.16 Walker says, "And this
confirms my belief: [A]s long as there is even one batterer left, none
of us are truly safe." '3 7 The most horrific part of the battered woman's
situation is that the person most threatening to her is also someone
that she may love, or at least shares her life or home with. There is
often nothing that the legal system can do to protect such a woman
until her situation has reached extremes.
Walker tells of how her working directly as a clinical psychologist
with battered women clients eventually led to health problems for
her, and to an end of that particular portion of her career. 8 In fact,
the first and the last chapters are mostly personal accounts of her
experiences as a psychologist and an expert witness. This book is
distinct from her previous works in that Walker reveals how the entire
process of working with and researching the lives of battered women
has taken its toll on her in a very personal way.
Walker's latest book is no less interesting than her previous
efforts, and the personal stories of women who have actually lived
through the abusive relationships (which Walker used more extensively
in her previous books) are still very compelling. Terrifying Love
demonstrates the transformation of one female clinical psychologist
into an ardent feminist advocate for non-violence. Walker indicates
that she wrote the book not only to inform the public about the
problems of abused women, but also "in the hope that some day
violence . . . will never again be inflicted on any human being,
anywhere." 3 9 Although her vision is ambitious, I do think books such
as her's serve a critical function. Only by reading story after story
about such severely abused women will those who do not have first
hand experience in this area begin to be aware of how serious and
34. WALXER, TERRIFYING LovE, supra note 4, at 255-58. See CARoL GILLGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
35. WALKER, TERRIIYING Lovw, supra note 4, at 92-97.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 97.
38. Id. at 253-55.
39. Id. at 5. Walker also believes that the need to abolish all violence is at the very
heart of the feminist cause. Id.
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how widespread the problems are, and to care about the people
involved.
For example, when I was working on this article, I had my
research assistant find and summarize recent cases on the issue of
battered women who killed their abusers and then claimed self-de-
fense.4 During the process of summarizing them, he later told me
that he was having nightmares about the cases, and that his wife
would sometimes have to awaken him in the middle of the night.
While I certainly was sorry that his sleep was disrupted, I did feel
that, as a result of this exposure, there was one more person who
would probably never take the issue of battered women for granted.
As another example, in her book Walker recalls giving a talk at a
woman's prison.4' She was nervous, and in order to break the tension,
she asked the audience about abuse in their families. 42 Almost every
woman present indicated that she had experienced or witnessed abuse
first hand.43 At least one of my teaching colleagues found this to be
amazing when I recounted the story. I must say that it did not surprise
me, as I have researched this area and am more aware of just how
widespread abuse is in our society. I just took it for granted.
On the other hand, my main criticism of Walker's book is that
she defends the actions of each and every battered woman she writes
about as being reasonable reactions to the phenomenon of being
abused. I can understand why she takes this view, since she has
worked closely with battered women and studied the patterns and
cycles of abuse for so many years. It certainly has been a radicalizing
experience for her, but Walker's mostly sympathetic view of the
battered woman's violent actions toward an abusive man is bound to
repulse those who are less involved with the "cause" of battered
women.
Cynthia K. Gillespie's book, Justifiable Homicide, focuses more
closely on the legal, rather than the psychological, aspects of the
situation where a battered woman kills her abuser. Not surprisingly,
the book is subtitled: Battered Women, Self-Defense, and the Law."
Unlike Walker, Gillespie is an attorney. She indicates in her preface
that she became interested in the issue of battered women who kill
their abusers in self-defense several years ago, when she wrote a brief
defending a woman who killed her abusive stepson. 45 Despite the
focus on the legal system, Gillespie still maintains the humanity and
40. See cases cited supra note 3.
41. WALcR, TERRDI4O LovE, supra note 4, at 230.
42. Id. at 230-32.
43. Id.
44. Gn.aspiE, supra note 5.
45. Id. at vii-viii.
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the horror of the battered woman's situation by using the anecdotal
technique throughout the book.
Gillespie has a distinctly feminist viewpoint in her work. She
believes that the problems that the battered woman encounters are
the result of the masculine assumptions that dominate the law of the
United States, as well as "our society's ambivalent and biased attitudes
about women and its acceptance of violence against them." Her
argument is that, although the law of self-defense is neutral on its
face, it is not applied fairly to men and women who act in self-
defense.
47
In the introductory chapter, she outlines some of the legal prob-
lems encountered by battered women in general and, more particu-
larly, those who have killed their batterers. The problem of pervasive
sexism is emphasized. Gillespie argues that our society simultaneously
deplores and excuses violence against women but never really admits
that a woman might need to use deadly force to protect herself:
A woman who wields a deadly weapon, even to defend herself,
presents a deeply disturbing image. Our prevailing idea of women's
true nature is that they are nurturers and life-givers, not life-takers.
There is something that strikes us as obscene, against nature, or
unholy about a woman who kills, that goes way beyond the illegality
or even the immorality of her act. It shakes some of our most deeply
held cultural stereotypes to their roots.4
The focus in chapter one centers on the sexist and stereotyped
attitudes of the police (who Gillespie characterizes as sometimes com-
placent, careless or vindictive); the prosecutors (overly zealous and
self-interested, in Gillespie's view); defense lawyers (who may give
bad advice); and judges (who may share the same prejudices as the
rest of the legal society) .9
Gillespie then proceeds to attempt to prove her two-part thesis.5 0
First, she describes how the law itself is permeated with male concepts
and attitudes. For example, in the second chapter, called "A Law
For Men," she gives a very complete and sometimes horrifying dis-
cussion of the history of the law of self-defense from 1066 in England
to the present in the United States." This chapter includes information
about the role and the rights of women in medieval times and in the
early years of United States history with regard to self-defense. For
46. Id. at x.
47. Id. at xi-xiii.
48. See id. at 12.
49. Id. at 13-30.
50. Id. at xi.
51. Id. at 31-92.
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example, in medieval times a woman was subject to her husband as
her baron, or lord." To kill one's husband was to commit treason,
and was punishable by being burned at the stake.53 American law did
not limit a man's right to beat his wife until the 1960's. 54
Gillespie then proceeds to a description of how the law in action
operates to discriminate against women in the area of self defense.
This is a common theme among feminists and legal writers when
discussing the claim of self-defense raised by a battered woman in a
homicide case." Gillespie specifically addresses the legal issues of
women's perceptions of the seriousness of the threatened harm, the
imminence of harm, and the duty to retreat in the context of a self-
defense claim.56
The "heart" of the book can be found in the chapters where
Gillespie discusses the doctrines of reasonableness as it applies to
women generally and as it applies in the case of the battered woman . 7
In Gillespie's view, the question of reasonableness, although neutral
on its face as a legal doctrine, is a masculine concept."8 In our analysis
of what is reasonable, society reveals its deepest fear, ambivalence
and prejudice about violence against women and women who are
violent.59 In fact, Gillespie voices doubts about whether a jury would
ever find it to be reasonable or rational for a battered woman to kill
her mate in self-defense. 60 One of these chapters also contains an
52. Id. at 37.
53. Id.
54. See ELIzABETH H. PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1987) (a thorough treatment
of family violence in the United States).
55. GILLEspm, supra note 5, at 50-92. See sources cited supra note 2.
56. GIL.SPIE, supra note 5, at 50-92.
57. Id. at 93-156.
58. Id. at 98-99.
59. Id. at 94.
60. Id. Specifically, Gillespie stated:
The question of reasonableness is the point at which our society's ambivalence
about violence against women and all of our collective prejudices and stereotypes
about women who are victims of male violence are apt to be injected into the jury's
deliberations. Every juror enters the jury box with deeply held, if unconscious, ideas
about human nature and how reasonable people behave and about marriage and the
proper roles of men and women within it. These beliefs, and many others (as well
as individual jurors' own life experiences) will naturally color the way the jury
evaluates the reasonableness of a woman defendant's claim of self-defense. A juror
who shares the old stereotype of women as irrational, emotional, inherently unrea-
sonable creatures will not be receptive to a woman's argument that what she did
when she took someone's life was reasonable. A juror who accepts the widespread
myths-that battered women are masochists who want to be hurt or nagging shrews
who drive their long-suffering mates to violence-will not be inclined to find any
defense against such "invited" beatings reasonable. A juror who has grown up with
our society's centuries-old conspiracy of silence about domestic violence, and cannot
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interesting and lengthy discussion of how sex stereotypes in our society
begin in the very early years of childhood and continue into adult
life. 6' For example, studies show that from a very early age, girls are
not encouraged to play as actively or develop their physical abilities
in the same way as boys. Parents perceive boys and girls differently,
even as infants. As they grow, boys are expected to be stronger and
more active, girls to be more delicate and quiet. However, these
perceived differences are not supported by the evidence. 62
These differing expectations continue to affect activities. Boys
are encouraged to develop their physical skills, to spend time outdoors,
and (most importantly) to learn to deal with physical conflict. Girls
are not expected to do these things. Such attitudes pervade children's
fairy tales and books, television shows and even the educational
system. In Gillespie's view, all of this adds up to one conclusion:
Women are trained to be physically helpless, and to be victims. 63 This
conclusion is something of a logical leap. It might be more accurate
to say that women are permitted and encouraged to be passive,
helpless, and victims, but that such attitudes are not tolerated in men.
Finally, Gillespie covers the issue of the use and admission of
expert testimony to explain the battered woman syndrome in order
to bolster a claim of self-defense in cases where an abused woman
has killed her abuser. 64 She describes the legal problems and goes a
step further, criticizing the use of such expert testimony. She argues
that using experts to "explain" why a battered woman would take
drastic action in response to a certain situation reinforces feminine
stereotypes, and even creates a new stereotype of the bona fide
battered woman, or a middle class battered woman.
65
Justifiable Homicide is a well-researched and well-written book.
It contains some useful endnotes and an excellent list of cases and
other sources of information. Gillespie shares much of Walker's strong
believe that men who appear to be normal and nice ever kill or injure their wives,
will have a very hard time seeing a woman's fear that she was about to be killed or
seriously hurt as reasonable. A juror who believes that acquitting any woman who
kills her husband will give all wives a "license to kill," and will result in an "open
season on men," will surely not find any such killing reasonable, no matter what the
circumstances. The reasonableness requirement, above all, allows those many jurors-
who, for no very clear reason, are appalled or frightened by the idea of a woman
taking a life; or who simply believe that no woman is ever, under any circumstances,
justified in killing her husband-to act on those feelings by finding the woman guilty
because her action was not reasonable.
Id.
61. Id. at 99-116.
62. Id. at 108-13.
63. Id. at 106.
64. Id. at 157-81.
65. Id. at 179-81.
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feminist viewpoint, although her emphasis is on the legal system,
rather than the psychology of the abusive relationship. She also shares
much of Walker's uncritical, accepting attitude toward the battered
woman's violent acts. I found the book's greatest strength to be some
of the strong feminist rhetoric voiced by the author. I found the
history and the studies cited, as well as Gillespie's analysis of them,
to give a fascinating perspective to our present law and culture. In a
way, Gillespie may be said to be stating the obvious: Men and women
are different, if for no other reason than that they are raised differ-
ently. But her argument for how we deal with that difference in the
legal system was very eloquent-we should not have two different
sets of laws, one for men and one for women, but that we should
have laws that are flexible enough to accommodate both the male
and the female perspectives.
Angela Browne, the author of When Battered Women Kill, has
worked with Lenore Walker for several years, and has written several
articles on the subject of battered women. 6 For her book, Browne
interviewed forty-two women in fifteen states who were accused of
killing or seriously injuring their abusers. 67 The interview questions
followed a common format but permitted the women to comment or
discuss other aspects of their relationships." For comparison, Browne
also interviewed 205 battered women who had not killed or attempted
to kill their mates.
69
At least partially as a result of her research technique, Browne
uses the anecdotal story, alternating with statistics and summaries of
her study results as the basic format of the book. The book is
organized as a chronology of a "typical" battering relationship. In
chapter two, entitled "Childhood Roots of Violence," Browne dis-
cusses the impact that either experiencing or observing violence as a
child has on people as adults. 70 She found that the strongest predictor
of experiencing future violent behavior for both sexes is the witnessing
of violence as a child between parents or parent figures. 7'
66. See, e.g., Roberta Thyfault et al., When Battered Women Kill: Evaluation and
Expert Witness Testimony Techniques, in DoMEsTIc VIOLENCE ON TRIAl: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE (Daniel J. Sonkin ed., 1987); Lenore E. Walker &
Angela Browne, Gender and Victimization by Intimates 53 J. PERSONALITY 179 (1985); Walker
et al., Beyond the Juror's Ken, supra note 2.
67. BROWNE, supra note 6, at 12.
68. Id. at 12-13.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 19-35.
71. Id. at 30-31. Browne cites several studies that support this conclusion. See WALKER,
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 1, at 149 (battering present in 80% of batterers'
homes in a study of over 400 women); Roy, Four Thousand Partners in Violence: A Trend
Analysis, in THE ABUSIVE PARTNER, supra note 1, at 34 (80% of abusers in 4,000 cases studied
were abused as children or witnessed the abuse of their mothers).
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In the chapter, "The Psychology of Intimate Relating: Differ-
ences in Men and Women," Browne abandons the storytelling ap-
proach. 72 Browne discusses how the partners in an abusive relationship
may share many of the characteristics found in any other romantic
relationship, but in this situation otherwise positive qualities become
warped. 73 For example, a battered woman may identify with her
abuser, or hold herself responsible for his behavior, and believe that
she can change it. An abusive man may actually have a very strong
romantic attachment to his partner, but reacts to his feelings of
vulnerability with panic and anger. He may then, in Browne's view,
refuse to recognize the true source of these feelings and blame his
mate, punishing her for making him feel insecure or angry.
74
In later chapters, Browne attempts to answer her initial question
and to isolate the factors that drive some women, but not others, to
strike back at their abusing partner with deadly force. Some portions
of this section are particularly painful to read, as Browne presents
some of the worst battering episodes related by the women." She
pinpoints some key elements that were predictive of homicide: Fre-
quency of abuse, severity of previous injuries, forced sexual acts,
man's intoxication, man's drug use, man's threats to kill woman, and
woman's threats to commit suicide. 76 She also mentions the concept
of a "turning point," where the abusing partner does something, or
threatens to do something, that is completely beyond the battered
woman's present perception of an "acceptable" level of brutality. 7
It is at this turning point that most homicides seem to occur. Another
important factor may be that the woman often lost all hope for an
improvement in the relationship at the time that violence escalates
beyond their previous experiences.
78
Browne also relates two other intriguing ideas in this part of her
book. First, she points out that whether the abused woman resorts
to homicide has as much or more to do with the characteristics of
the batterer, or the severity of abusive conduct, than it does with her
own characteristics. 79 Second, she recounts how several of the women
72. See BROWNE, supra note 6, at 75-87.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 95. For example, Browne presents some horrific stories of violent and bizarre
sexual abuse. The batterers would frequently rape their wives after a beating. Some men inserted
objects into the woman's vagina, forced anal or oral sex, sex with third parties or sex with
animals. Many of the women saw the sexual assaults as the worst forms of brutalization. Id.
at 95-103.
76. Id. at 127.
77. Id. at 128-30.
78. Id. at 127-30.
79. Id.
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reacted with sorrow and disbelief when told of the death of their
abusing mates, even though they themselves brought about the deaths.8°
In one of the final chapters, "The Legal System and Battered
Women," Browne discusses the legal system's treatment of the bat-
tered woman from the perspective of the battered woman herself."'
Not surprisingly, this view is again highly critical of the traditional
legal responses to these situations. This chapter also covers negotiated
pleas, trials, and the use of self- defense claims in some detail.82 This
section is written for the layman and is not of great use to the legal
professional.
Finally, Browne concludes with some recommendations for the
prevention or reduction in the number of such killings, such as further
study, early intervention, and counseling.83 She also includes an in-
teresting epilogue, detailing how each of the cases in her book was
finally resolved.8
The book is interesting as a study, particularly since there has
been a great deal of litigation and discussion about this issue, but not
much previous analysis or research into why and when an abused
woman herself reacts with deadly violence. Browne shares some of
Walker's and Gillespie's themes in her book-the role of fear and
learned helplessness in the battered woman's situation, and the role
of women as caregivers. 5 Unlike Walker's conclusion, Browne does
appear to believe that there is a discernible difference in the situations
of those women who do kill their abusers and those who do not. The
value of this book is in its psychology, the "why" of the homicide
when a battered woman kills. Browne sees some rational connection
between previous conduct and the ultimate conclusion of each story
in death. This is both painful and hopeful since, if we can understand
the why, we may someday be able to prevent some of the violence.
Battered Women Who Kill, by Charles Patrick Ewing, is an
unusual combination of psychological and legal scholarship. At the
time the book was written, Ewing was an Associate Professor of Law
and an Associate Professor of Psychology. His work is less clinical
and more scholarly than the other three books. I think that perhaps
for both of these reasons the book is somewhat less compelling and
the ultimate effect less appalling than the other books reviewed here,
80. Id. at 141-43.
81. Id. at 159-77.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 179-86.
84. Id. at 187-90.
85. Id. at 75-87, 109-30.
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particularly since it is less personal. In fact, the first time I read the
book, it struck me as an expanded law review article.
In the initial chapters, Ewing presents basic information about
the patterns of abusive behavior between couples, and discusses such
concepts as learned helplessness, depression, suicidal tendencies, and
the physical and emotional barriers the battered woman faces in
seeking help. 6 He reviews one hundred cases where battered women
killed their abusers, and uses the facts of these cases throughout his
book.17 This book, like the others in the area, contains a discussion
of the legal issues that the women in these cases face and also includes
an appendix which summarizes the one hundred cases. 8
The central thesis of Ewing's book is a legal one; he argues for
a new theory of self-defense, based on a psychological theory of what
one's "self" is.19 Ewing explains that one's self is "one's physical
appearance, mannerisms, character, beliefs, attitudes, values, identity,
perception, cognition, memory, etc ..... [T]he self is continually
evolving and being shaped by one's life experiences. '" 90 According to
the theory, if a person's life experiences are self-validating, then that
person has a sense of being autonomous, alive, whole, and worth-
while. 91 However, if the experiences are negative, a person risks the
loss of their sense of self, and may need to take action to save it.92
Ewing, like Walker, draws an analogy between battered women
and the victims of other forms of terrorism, where victims and captors
may form some sort of traumatic bonding. 93 The study of the rela-
tionship between victim and criminal is known as victimology, an
interdisciplinary behavioral science. 94 Ewing focuses on the studies
involving prolonged contact between victim and criminal: Rape, kid-
napping, and armed robbery. 95 He finds many psychological similar-
86. EwING, supra note 7, at 1-21. Ewing also lists several factors that differentiate
battered women who kill from those who do not, including more frequent physical abuse, more
serious injuries, more frequent death threats (to self or others), more frequent child abuse
(abuse by the batterer of the woman's children), and more frequent sexual abuse. Id. at 35-36.
87. Id. at 31-34.
88. Id. at 99-142. The one hundred cases were compiled from a variety of sources-
media reports, books, articles, and court opinions-all published between 1978 and 1986. Id.
at 31.
89. Id. at 63.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. Ewing refers to R.D. LAING, THE DIVIDED SELF (1970), and to HEiNz KouT,
TIE RESTORATION OF THE SELF (1977), in this section. EwIo, supra note 7, at 63-66.
93. EwINo, supra note 7, at 70-76.
94. Id. at 73-75.
95. Id. at 70-75. Ewing cites frequently to the following articles and essays: Rona M.
Fields, Research on the Victims of Terrorism, in VicTms OF TERRORISM 137 (Frank M. Ochberg
& David A. Soskis eds., 1982); Irene Frieze et al., Describing the Victims of Crime and Violence,
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ities in the reactions of both groups to their trauma. In the case of
the abused woman, the victim may be married to, live with, and in
some sense "love" her captor, making her situation even more dif-
ficult.9
Thus, Ewing proposes a theory of psychological self-defense,
where the use of deadly force would be justified where "reasonably
necessary to prevent the infliction of extremely serious psychological
injury." 97 The key term extremely serious psychological injury is
defined as "gross and enduring impairment of one's psychological
functioning which significantly limits the meaning and value of one's
physical existence.'98 Ewing would also limit the use of this defense
to persons who were being physically threatened at or near the time
of the killing. 99 Furthermore, the burden of proof of psychological
harm would be on the defendant.' °°
Ewing then attempts to defend the theory, first arguing that it is
not inconsistent with current self-defense law.' 0' He interprets several
legal rules associated with current self-defense doctrine, such as the
no-retreat rule,'0 or the castle doctrine, 103 as being designed to protect
certain psychological interests, such as the right to personal autonomy
and the principle of lesser evils."04 For example, the no-retreat rule
provides that when a person is attacked with an imminent threat of
death or serious bodily injury, he is not required to run away, even
though he could do so safely; he may stand his ground and defend
himself. 05 In Ewing's view, we have this rule for two reasons. First,
we will not require a person to be passive in the face of attempted
in VICTIMS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE: REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON THE VICTIMS OF
CREME AND VIOLENCE 19 (Arnold S. Kahn ed., 1984); Martin Symonds, Victims of Violence:
Psychological Effects and Aftereffects, 35 Am. J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 19 (1975); Thomas Strentz,
The Stockholm Syndrome: Law Enforcement Policy and Ego Defenses of the Hostage, in
FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCmATRY 137 (Fred Wright et al. eds., 1980).
96. EWINO, supra note 7, at 83-85.
97. Id. at 79.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 91.
100. Id. at 89-91.
101. Id. at 89.
102. In a majority of American jurisdictions, one who is not the aggressor need not
retreat before responding to an attack with deadly force, even if one can do so in complete
safety. WAYNE LAFAvE & AUSTIN SCOTr, CRMuAL LAW 460-61 (2d ed. 1986); ROLLIN PERKINS
& RONALD BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1133-34 (3d ed. 1982).
103. EwING, supra note 7, at 81-82. The castle doctrine is a corollary to the no-retreat
rule. It is universally recognized that an innocent party who is attacked need not retreat from
her home or "castle." The concept of castle has been extended to include one's place of
business. LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 102, at 461; PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 102, at 1134-
36.
104. EwING, supra note 7, at 83-85.
105. Id. at 80-81.
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physical domination or a humiliating role.'16 Secondly, the culpability
of the attacker changes the balance in favor of the preservation of
the defender's personhood.107
Ewing also tries to anticipate and answer some practical objec-
tions to his theory in this section. He discusses problems of spurious
claims, lack of deterrence, difficulty of jury evaluation, and under-
standing of the concept of psychological self-defense.I'm Ewing would
reduce spurious claims by limiting the defense to persons who were
being threatened at or near the time of the killing and by putting the
burden of proof of psychological harm on the defendant.'09 Ewing
advances several arguments relating to the lack of deterrence issue.
First, it is unlikely that battered women seriously evaluate the costs
and benefits of killing their abusers and, even if they do, they might
opt for the killing since the only alternative they face is the destruction
of their ultimate "self.""' 0 Second, it is unlikely that a layperson
would take advantage of such an abstract legal rule since she would
neither understand it nor could she be certain that it would apply to
her."' Third, even if a lay person could understand the concept, it
might serve to deter a batterer from excessive violence." 2 Fourth,
spousal homicide is not usually a crime that is repeated."' As to the
jury issue, Ewing argues that our system of justice frequently requires
this difficult level of evaluation.' '
4
Ewing's proposal is both unique and revolutionary. He presents
and argues it well, and appears to base it on solid research. His
analogies to other self-defense doctrines are well taken. However, the
theory has a basic flaw that Ewing himself notes but fails to deal
with adequately. Specifically, the flaw is the abstract, esoteric, and
chimerical nature of the basic self-defense question "When has ex-
tremely serious psychological harm occurred?" The other legal self-
defense doctrines discussed by Ewing are based on fundamental psy-
chological concepts, but are capable of proof, at least partially, by
physical evidence. For example, when using the castle doctrine, the
defense will show evidence that the defendant was attacked in his or
her own home and thus had no duty to retreat. Ewing's theory is
completely subjective, looking into the mind of this individual person
106. Id. at 83-85.
107. Id. at 84-85.
108. Id. at 85-94.
109. Id. at 89-91.
110. Id. at 87-88.
111. Id. at 88-89.
112. Id. at 87-89.
113. Id. at 89.
114. Id. at 86-91.
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to see when their sense of self is at risk of annihilation, rather than
looking at what an objectively reasonable person would believe.
This theory is interesting and laudable, for it attempts to take
the moral high road, elevating substance over form. However, it is
limited by the realities of our current legal system and pre-existing
attitudes, ideas, and biases about the way the law should operate.
Although an interesting piece of scholarship, Ewing's book would be
of most interest to the legal theorist or philosopher.
In recent years there has been a lot of attention focused on the
specific issue of the battered woman, and the battered woman who
eventually fights violence with violence. This is with good reason,
since it is a widespread, serious problem for our society. The authors
whose works are discussed above struggle with notions of male dom-
inance, experiment with legal tests, and manipulate the instruments
of law enforcement in an attempt to figure out exactly what to do
with, and for, these people in abusive relationships. However, as the
authors themselves sometimes indicate, the problem is so much deeper
in our culture that these issues just scratch the surface.
In our society, violence is almost completely acceptable as enter-
tainment in a wide variety of situations (e.g., sports, television,
movies) and as an appropriate form of punishment both within and
outside of the criminal justice system. Weapons are commonly found
in our homes. In fact, in many cases where a battered woman kills
her abuser, she does so with a gun that she finds or is readily accessible
to her." 5
Studies tend to show that violence has a spillover effect.1 6 Re-
peated exposure to violence in the media can lead to a more casual
or jaundiced attitude toward violence in real life." 7 The authors of
one study on spousal abuse in the military found the abuse encoun-
tered was more severe and frequent than what was found in compa-
115. See, e.g., People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), appeal
denied, 1990 Cal. LEXIS 906 (Cal. Mar. 1, 1990); People v. Hare, 782 P.2d 831, 831 (Colo.
Ct. App.), cert. granted, 1989 Colo. LEXIS 555 (Colo. Nov. 27, 1989), and aff'd, 800 P.2d
1317 (Colo. 1990); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 575 (Kan. 1988); State v. Moore, 568 So.
2d 612, 614 (La. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 796 (Minn. 1989); State
v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 11 (N.C. 1989); State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 971 (Ohio 1990);
State v. Furlough, 797 S.W.2d 631, 637 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990); State v. Hanson, 793 P.2d
1001, 1001 (Wash. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 803 P.2d 325 (Wash. 1990); Griffin v. State, 749
P.2d 246, 249 (Wyo. 1988).
116. STAus & GELLaS, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 12, at 520-21.
117. For example, the 1986 Attorney General's Commission on Pornography found a
causal relationship between exposure to violent pornography and increasingly violent attitudes
toward women. ATT'Y GEN.'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT
322-49 (1986). See STrAus & GELLES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 12, at 520-21.
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rable civilian relationships.I" The authors hypothesize that the "military
effect, a term meaning the total impact of the military indoctrination/
socialization experience ... legitimizes a pervasive sense (and expec-
tation) of violence."" 9 The authors even found some evidence of a
spillover violent effect into the community where military bases dom-
inated the area.'20
As Richard Gelles and Murray Straus, two prolific writers in the
area of domestic violence, point out, violence is essentially a political
question, not a legal one. ' 2 Why are people violent? Why are parents,
spouses, and children abusive towards their own family members?
Gelles and Straus say it is because society lets them. 22 Individuals are
violent and abusive because they can be. We as a society decide what
is an acceptable level of violence and what is an acceptable level of
interference with individual privacy. We as a society decide what is
"deviant" violence. As a result, the question is political, an issue of
public policy. 23 The answers to what is an acceptable or appropriate
level of violence vary across economic, racial, social, professional and
religious, as well as sexual, lines.
When dealing with the problem of child abuse, the question shifts
the debate from issues of family privacy to more general, but still
important, questions of what societal consensus is and should be on
our tolerance of parental violence towards children. Gelles and Straus
give the example of Sweden's ban on the spanking of children. 24
Sweden only changed its criminal code, not its penal code, so there
is no punishment for parents who spank their children. 2  However,
the authors point out that the purpose of the law is to demonstrate
a moral objection to certain kinds of conduct and that it is enforced
by internal and social, not necessarily legal, controls.'2 Sweden also
prohibits corporal punishment in schools, has abolished capital pun-
ishment, and strictly controls television and movie violence, particu-
118. SHUE ET AL., supra note 12, at 75-79. The authors indicate that the worst forms of
violence in civilian families were the norm for the military families. Id. at 79.
119. Id. at 82. This military indoctrination would include boot camp, the "fighter spirit,"
a hierarchical authority structure and the creation of stressful situations for the soldiers. Id.
The authors also found that military families experienced more violence than veteran's families,
who in turn experienced more violence than civilian families. Id. at 83-84.
120. Id. at 83-86.
121. See RICHARD GEIaES & MURRAY STRAus, INTIMATE VIOLENCE 57 (1988) [hereinafter







larly for children. 27 This attitude is in stark contrast to the American
view, where a large majority of those surveyed in one study believed
that parents have not just the legal right, but the moral obligation to
spank or slap their children.1
28
Many feminists would agree with Gelles and Straus in principle,
but they believe the political view is almost entirely shaped by gender-
related discrimination, both past and present. In the eyes of many,
feminism is a seamless web where all issues affecting women are
related by concepts of male dominance and female oppression in our
culture. 29 As a result, the feminists tend to distrust a "political!'
(male-dominated) solution to what they see as an inherently feminist
problem of male violence against women.3 0 Personally, although I
can see the vital feminist component of this issue, I tend to believe
the problem is a combination of societal attitudes about women and
attitudes about violence.
Aren't these concepts related? Certainly. However, I tend to
agree with authors like Gelles and Straus who point out that the focus
should be on the vulnerability of the victims of violence, and that
this vulnerability is not exclusively linked to sexism in the system,
legal or social. We need to change the way we view women, and the
way we treat women. Part of that change will in fact be accomplished
through the revision of legal rules, consciousness-raising, and edu-
cation. But the sea of change will have to come about through deeper,
tougher, and more fundamental revision of our thoughts about vio-
lence.
Many American liberal thinkers become very threatened when we
talk about changing fundamental attitudes about something as sub-
jective as violence. The very idea seems to tread on traditional civil
liberties because it smacks of censorship, big brother, or thought
control. The debate about control of pornography is a good example
of this type of fear."' This is where feminist thought and scholarship
127. Id. at 195.
128. Id. at 195-96. STRAus & GELLES, PHYSICAl. VIOLENCE, supra note 12, at 516. Studies
cited show that 80% to 90% of the adult population believe that there is such an obligation.
Id.
129. See generally CATHARINE MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); STEmIEM, supra
note 10; Christine A. Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 1043
(1987) [hereinafter Littleton, Feminist Legal Theory]; Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender,
55 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1988).
130. See STRAUS & GEu.as, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 12, at 11-14, 384-86 (feminists
distrust empirical or quantitative research as inherently male-biased).
131. Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, two prominent feminist authors and
activists, drafted a controversial law designed to eliminate pornography. Catharine A. Mac-
Kinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1-2 (1985)
[hereinafter MacKinnon, Pornography]. The law was adopted by the city of Indianapolis, but
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can come back into play. Feminism asks the key question-civil
liberties for whom? Civil liberties should be a part of everyone's
rights, including children, the old, the infirm, as well as women, to
be free of violence and terror in their own homes, particularly from
members of their own families. Any sort of protection of the right
of a parent, a man, or a stronger person to abuse another human
being because of a "privacy" interest is abhorrent. If we try to protect
such rights, it should make us question our values.
On the other hand, the change in society need not, and probably
should not, come exclusively from strictly legal sanctions, which are
a form of violence in themselves. We, as a society, could do many
things, both within and outside of the legal system, to reduce the
amount and severity of violence and abuse in the culture. Some
progress has been made in the area of family violence in the past
several years. For example, mandatory reporting requirements for
suspected cases of child abuse appear to have increased public aware-
ness of the problem.' a2 There is some evidence that quick, no-nonsense
intervention and arrest in spousal abuse cases decreases further inci-
dents of abuse.' 33 Other, more general, proposed actions include:
Abolition of capital punishment, elimination of corporal punishment
from the school system, strict gun control legislation, and regulation
of violent toys and television programming for children. 3 4 Another
alternative that exists is to boycott violent films, plays, sports, or
the Seventh Circuit held it to be unconstitutional in American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut,
771 F.2d 323, 324 (7th Cir. 1985). Dworkin and MacKinnon's thesis is that pornography, like
Gelles and Straus' view of violence, is a political, not a legal question. MacKinnon, Pornography,
supra. In their view, pornography reflects male dominance and male objectification of women.
Pornography thus creates a viewpoint that is evil and should be eliminated. See, e.g., Andrea
Dworkin, Pornography is a Civil Rights Issue for Women, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 55 (1987-
1988); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 321 (1984)
[hereinafter MacKinnon, Moral Issue]; MacKinnon, Pornography, supra, at 1-2. Other feminists
are very critical of this ordinance, arguing that it is unconstitutional and that sexually explicit
material can be both positive and liberating for women and men. See Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia
A. Law, Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship Task Force et al., in American
Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 69 (1987-1988).
132. In their survey, Gelles and Straus found a decrease in child abuse between 1975 and
1985. STRAUSS & GEu.ES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 12, at 116-17, 121. They also mention
that educational efforts and an increase in the number of social workers for child abuse cases
may account for the decreasing numbers. Id. The author personally doubts that a decrease in
child abuse is widely documented.
133. See SiUPE ET AL., supra note 12, at 103-21; STRAUS & GELLES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE,
supra note 12, at 482-83. See also Littleton, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 129, at 53.
134. See GELLS & STRAUS, INTrmATE VIOLENCE, supra note 121, at 196-99; STRAUS &
GELLus, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 12, at 521. See also Elissa Benedek, Baseball, Apple
Pie, and Violence: Is it American?, in FAammy VIOLENCE: EMERGING IssUs OF A NATIONAL
CRISIS 9-12 (Leah Dickstein & Carol Nadelson eds., 1989) [hereinafter EMERGING ISSUES];
Littleton, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 129, at 55-56 (suggests legal recognition of
relationships outside the traditional, heterosexual model be recognized).
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other forms of "entertainment." A variety of educational programs
could be conducted through public school systems or through church
and community organizations. Possible topics include parenting, deal-
ing with stress in relationships, marriage, and conflict resolution.
Alcohol and drug information, education, and counseling could in-
clude more information on the connection between the use of drugs
and possible violent behavior.'35 More ambitious plans might call for
a complete prohibition of corporal punishment, or any act that phys-
ically hurts or intends to hurt any person, not just a child.'36
In the broadest sense, researchers seem to agree that family
violence would decrease in many quarters if society would work on
several general issues. To return to part of the feminist agenda,
researchers have found both child and spousal abuse to be more
common in male dominant families. This is attributed to the fact that
the man, as head of the family, may feel that he has the definitive
word in all decisions. If the man, as head of the family, does not get
the final word, he may use force as the last resort. Straus and another
researcher, Christine Smith, state: "One cannot emphasize too strongly
the preventative value of sexual equality, both within and outside the
family.1' 17 One of the most interesting conclusions of Gelles and
Straus' research on family violence is that women who are housewives
are more violent toward their children than women who work outside
the home. 3 ' The authors hypothesize that working mothers spend less
time with their children and therefore are less at risk for abusive
conduct. 3 9 Straus and Gelles also believe that employment outside
the home gives women more status, power, and control within the
family structure. '40
Researchers also mention the importance of poverty programs.
Families in stress tend to have higher levels of violent behavior. If
135. See GELLES & STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 121, at 199; STRAUS & GELLES,
PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 12, at 516-17; Benedek, supra note 134, at 9-12; Mary Lystad,
Community Prevention Programs in Family Violence, in EMERGNO ISSUES, supra note 134, at
221-25.
136. Gelles and Straus strongly advocate this rule. See GELLES & STRAUS, INTIMATE
VIOLENCE, supra note 121, at 197-99; STRAUS & GELLES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 12, at
517-20. They point out that the informal, and formal, rule outside the family is "that you
cannot hit anyone, even if he or she behaves terribly," except for self-defense. Id. at 516. The
rule is just the opposite within the family. Id. at 515.
137. See STRAUS & GELLEs, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 12, at 515. See also GELLES
& STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 121, at 203; SHUPE ET AL., supra note 12, at 89-99;
David Adams, Stages of Anti-Sexist Awareness and Change for Men Who Batter, in EMERONG
ISSUES, supra note 134, at 63-94; Littleton, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 129, at 53-55.
138. STRAUS & GELLES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 12, at 248-49.
139. Id. at 248.
140. Id. at 248-49, 274-77.
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employment opportunities, health care and other support is available,
it is believed that stress, and hopefully the resulting violence, can be
reduced. 
4 1
In my Family Law class, we cover the notions of punishment
versus child abuse. I usually tell the class about the Swedish idea of
spanking as an improper form of punishment. The typical reaction is
either one of incredulity or of amusement. Class members sometime
become angry when I discuss some other proposals for controlling
exposure to violence and to instruments of violence. I do not mean
to pick on the students, but I think their attitude is typical of the
kind of prejudice that advocates of non-violence encounter. This
opinion emerges from an educated, comparatively young, and rela-
tively open-minded group of people.
In summary, I believe the feminist approach is not the ultimate
solution to the problem of family violence. Although the feminist
view has done a valuable service in opening our collective eyes and
making us aware of the hidden problem of spousal abuse and of
helping many women who were and are in truly desperate situations,
I do not think it goes far enough. Prevention is the key, and this will
affect both men and women. Sexism in the family, in the social
system, and in the legal system must go, but so must violence.
141. See GELLES & STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 121, at 201-03. Straus and
Gelles' 1985 study found that blue collar workers and low income families had higher rates of
assaults by husbands, STRAUS & GELLES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 12, at 194-96, and
found that there is some evidence of higher rates of child abuse in blue collar and low income
families. Id. at 249-51.
